In Ellsberg paradox, decision makers that are partially informed about the actual probability distribution violate the expected utility paradigm. This paper develops a theory of decision making with a partially specified probability. The paper takes an axiomatic approach using Anscombe-Aumann's (1963) setting, and is based on a concave integral for capacities (see Lehrer, 2005 ).
Introduction
Ellsberg paradox demonstrates a situation where a decision maker violates expected utility theory. This violation stems from the partial information that the decision maker receives about the actual distribution. This paper develops a theory of decision making with a partially-specified probability. The paper takes an axiomatic approach using Anscombe-Aumann's setting (see Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) , and is based on the concave integral for capacities (see Lehrer, 2005) .
The orthodox Bayesian model assumes that a decision maker assigns a probability to every event. In certain variations of this model, including those that relax this assumption, the probability might be either distorted (Quiggin, 1982 , Yaari, 1987 and Gul, 1991 , non-additive (Schmiedler, 1989) or multiple (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) . In this paper, the decision maker obtains partial information about the underlying regular (i.e., additive) probability. This information might include the probability of some events, but not of all, or of the expectation of some random variables, but not of all.
An act assigns a lottery to every state of nature. Like in Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , a complete preference order is defined over the set of acts. However, comparing acts entails using available information. The question arises as to how one should treat available information and how one should treat unavailable information. The model presented here takes an extreme approach to this issue.
The decision maker uses available information to its full extent while completely ignoring any unavailable information.
Any act is evaluated in terms of the "expected" utility that it yields. The latter is calculated by expressing the act under examination in terms of the information available. Using this information, the decision maker decomposes this act into acts that can be defined solely in terms of the information at hand. For instance, if the probability of event A is available, an act, defined as 'the lottery assigned to any state in A is, say , and to any other state the lottery assigned is k', is expressed only in terms of the information available. Further, when two acts are expressed in the information available, then the act that results from choosing one of them at random is also expressed in terms of the information available.
Acts defined this way are easy to evaluate: the expectation can be calculated since all the information needed to accomplish this task is available. The problem, though, concerns acts that cannot be expressed in terms of the information available, meaning that one cannot evaluate them by calculating the expected utility they yield. In this case, the decision maker considers the best approximation possible that uses only what is known. The decision maker then evaluates an act according to the expected utility of the the best approximation yields.
Two models of decision making under uncertainty are proposed here. The axiomatization of these models is essentially based on five axioms, all of a rather standard form: completeness, continuity, independence, monotonicity and ambiguity aversion. The first three are as in von-Neumann and Morgenstern This model involves a second version of the independence axiom which applies to strongly fat-free acts.
A strongly fat-free act is a fat-free act which remains fat-free even if mixed with a constant act. While in von-Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) the independence axiom applies to all acts, and in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) it applies only to constant acts, here it applies to strongly fat-free acts. The axiom states that when one act is preferred to another, this preference stays intact also when the two acts are mixed with a strongly fat-free act.
The second version, together with completeness, continuity, monotonicity and an additional axiom (which states that a constant act is strongly fat-free), implies that the preference order is determined by evaluating acts based on a regular probability specified over some events (that do not necessarily form a sub-algebra) and on some random variables. The latter means that the expectations of some random variables are given.
It is important to note that the general form of decision making with partially-specified probabilities (not that with sub-algebra) is axiomatized without explicitly requiring ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion is a consequence of the other axioms, and specifically of the independence axiom applied to strongly fat-free acts.
In a Savage's model, Epstein and Zhang (2001) defined unambiguous and ambiguous events. They axiomatize the case where there are a probability specified on unambiguous events and a utility function that represent the preference order restricted to acts that are measurable w.r.t. 1 unambiguous events.
The model of Epstein and Zhang (2001) remains silent on the analysis of choices among acts that involve ambiguous events. In this model the probability is specified on a λ-system 2 rather than on an algebra.
In the model presented here, there are no explicit definitions of what is ambiguous and of what is unambiguous. Rather, everything that turns to be unambiguous essentially results from the particular independence axiom employed. This axiom, together with the concave integral (lehrer, 2005) , enables a complete representation of the preference order. Further, in this model unambiguity goes beyond a wellstructured set of events: the probability could be specified on any set of events that has no particular structure, or on any set of random variables.
One might confuse partial preference ordering as in Bewley (2001) with partially-specified probabilities.
In order to avoid such confusion it should be stressed that, as opposed to Bewley (2001) , the completeness assumption is fully kept here: any two acts are comparable in the preference order. In other words, either one act is strictly preferred to the other or they are equivalent. In the current context, this complete preference order is determined by the evaluation of acts that is based on a partially-specified probability.
Partially-specified decision making is carried on to strategic interactions in order to introduce partiallyspecified equilibrium. In a partially-specified equilibrium, players do not have precise knowledge of the 1 with respect to 2 A λ-system is a set of subsets which is closed under complement and under union of disjoint sets. mixed strategy played by each of the other players. Players know only the probability of some subsets of strategies, without knowing the precise sub-division of probabilities within these subsets. In other words, the mixed strategies played (which are probability distributions over pure strategies) are partiallyspecified. Moreover, different players may know different specifications of the mixed strategy employed by any individual. When the information of all players is complete, the partially-specified equilibrium coincides with Nash equilibrium.
The model of decision making under partially-specified probability implies ambiguity aversion. This, in turn, implies that the best-response correspondence is convex valued. Consequently, for any information structure there exists a partially-specified equilibrium.
In order to illustrate the idea behind the notion of partially specified equilibrium, consider commuters that use a certain road system. A typical commuter might hear on the radio about traffic conditions on some particular main roads, but certainly not about the conditions in any tiny alley. Thus, unlike the traditional assumption that underlies Nash equilibrium, a commuter is unable to respond in the best way to all other commuters' actions, simply because these actions are not fully known to her. A typical commuter plans the optimal route that would minimize her traveling time based on the partial information she obtains about the traffic situation.
The road system is in a partially-specified equilibrium if any commuter takes the best possible route, given the partial specification she obtains about the actual traffic conditions. The information that a player obtains about other players' strategies is not restricted to product-sets.
Therefore, the definition of partially-specified equilibrium can be extended to cases where before playing the game players may obtain correlated signals. This yields the partially-specified correlated equilibrium, which extends the notion of correlated equilibrium ).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a motivating example: Ellsberg paradox. Section 3 contains the model and the axioms. Section 4 introduces partially-specified probabilities and how to integrate w.r.t. them. Section 5 provides the two main theorems: a decision making model with a probability specified on a sub-algebra and a decision making model with a partially-specified probability.
The proofs of the main theorems are given in Section 6. The partially-specified equilibrium is introduced in Section 7. A discussion of axioms and of various variations of the model is given in Section 8. These include discussions on limited use of information and framing effects (sub-section 8.2); and on the difficulty of adopting an orthodox Bayesian view when obtaining only a partial specification about the probability (sub-section 8.9).
A paradoxical phenomenon related to time inconsistency that seems to be intrinsic to decision making with a partially-specified probability is demonstrated in sub-section 8.8 (Example 8). The paper ends with Section 9 with some final comments on the connection between partially-specified probabilities and cooperative game theory.
Ellsberg paradox -a motivating example
Suppose that an urn contains 30 red balls and 60 balls that are either white or black. A ball is randomly drawn from the urn and a decision maker is given a choice between the two gambles.
Gamble X: to receive $100 if a red urn is drawn.
Gamble Y: to receive $100 if a white urn is drawn.
In addition, the decision maker is also given the choice between these two gambles:
Gamble Z: to receive $100 if a red or black ball is drawn.
Gamble T: to receive $100 if a white or black ball is drawn.
It is well documented that most people strongly prefer Gamble X to Gamble Y and Gamble T to Gamble Z. This is a violation of the expected utility theory.
There are three states of nature in this scenario: R, W and B, one for each color. Denote by S the set containing these states. Each of the gambles corresponds to a real function (a random variable) defined over S. For instance, Gamble X corresponds to the random variable X, defined as X(R) = 100 and X(W ) = X(B) = 0. Let Y , Z and T be the functions that correspond to Y, Z and T, respectively.
Denote A = {∅, S, {R}, {W, B}}. There is a probability of drawing a black ball, but this probability is unknown to the decision maker. Only the probabilities of the four events in the sub-algebra A are known to the decision maker: P (∅) = 0, P (S) = 1, P ({R}) = . In other words, the probability P is partially-specified.
The random variable X can be expressed as a linear combination of characteristic functions of events of which the probability is specified. Using only the four events in A, X can be decomposed as 3 X = 100·1l {R} . This decomposition is used for evaluating X: X is evaluated at X = 100P (R) = 100 · 1 3 . When one tries to do the same for Y , one cannot obtain a precise decomposition of Y . The maximal non-negative function which is below Y and can be written solely in terms of the events in A is 0 · 1l S . The function Y is therefore evaluated at 0. Since, 100 · 1 3 > 0, X is preferred to Y . A similar method applied to Z and T yields, Z ≥ 100 · 1l {R} and the right-hand side is the greatest of its kind. Thus, the evaluation of Z is 100 · 1 3 , while T is decomposed as 100 · 1l {W,B} . Therefore, the evaluation of W is 100 · 2 3 . Since 100 · 1 3 < 100 · 2 3 , Gamble T is preferred to Gamble Z. The intuition is that the decision maker bases her evaluation of random variables only on well-known figures, namely on the probability of the events whose probability is specified. The best estimate is provided then by the maximal function which is not larger than the random variable and can be expressed in terms of these events. The evaluation of a random variable is based on this estimate.
3 1lA is the indicator of a set A, known also as the characteristic function of A.
3 The model and axioms
The model
Let N be a finite set of outcomes and ∆(N ) be the set of distributions over N . S is a finite state space.
Denote by L the set of all functions from S to ∆(N ) and L c the set of all constant functions in L. An element of L is called an act. The constant function that attains the value y will be denoted by y (i,e., y(s) = y for every s ∈ S). L is a convex set:
A decision maker has a binary relation over L. We say that is complete if for every f and g in L either f g or g f . It is transitive if for every f, g and h in L, f g and g h imply f h. The order is non-trivial if there are two acts f and g such that f g.
Axioms
(i) Weak-Order: The relation is non-trivial, complete and transitive.
The relation defined over L induces a binary relation 4 , , over ∆(N ) as follows: y z iff y z. The relation induces the binary relations and ∼: f g iff f g and not g f ; f ∼ g iff f g and g f .
Let f and g be two acts. We denote f ≥ g when f (s) g(s) for every s ∈ S and f > g when f ≥ g and f (s) g(s) for at least one s ∈ S. For every f ∈ L, denote W (f ) = {g; f ≥ g}.
(ii) Monotonicity: For every f and g in L, if f ≥ g, then f g.
Axioms (i) and (ii) imply that there are two constant acts c 1 and c 2 such that c 1 c 2 .
(2) We say that an act g derives from act f , if there is a function ϕ from ∆(N ) to itself such that g = ϕ•f .
The set of all acts that are derived from f is denoted D(f ).
Let f be an act. It is fat-free if when a lottery assigned by f to a state is replaced by a worse one, the resulting act is strictly inferior to f . In a fat-free act there is no single lottery that can be reduced while maintaining the quality of the act. In contrast, in an act that is not fat-free, there is at least one state whose assigned lottery can be replaced by a worse one without affecting its quality: the modified act is equivalent to the original one.
Any act induces a partition of the state space into events: those subsets of states over which the act is constant. An act g is derived from an act f if the partition induced by f is finer than that induced by g.
Technically speaking, this means that g is measurable 5 with respect to f . An act f is strongly fat-free if any convex combination of f with a constant act is fat-free. It may occur that an act is fat-free because the lotteries it assigns to some states are the worst possible lotteries, and these cannot be pushed further down. The test of whether f is strongly fat-free or not is done by mixing it with some constant act: αf + (1 − α)c 1 . Now, all the lotteries are uniformly pushed up and are all strictly preferred to the worst lottery. If after such a mixing there is no way to reduce the lotteries without harming the quality of αf + (1 − α)c 1 , then f itself is strongly fat-free.
Remark 1 Lemma 4 below shows that the definition of SFaF does not depend on the choice of c 1 , as long as there is c 2 that satisfies c 1 c 2 . The subject is further discussed in subsection 8.5.
Example 1 Consider Ellsberg's urn described in Section 2. Suppose that N is the set of integers between 0 and 100. The act X, which takes the values 100 on R and 0 on the rest is FaF because any reduction in any prize results in a worse act. For instance X which takes the values 99 on R and 0 on the rest is worse than X. On the other hand, Y is not FaF: Y , which coincides with Y on R and B and is equal to 99 on W , is equivalent to Y .
Any act that takes one value on R and another value on {W, B} is derived from X. For instance, the act that is constantly equal to 50 and the act that takes the value 11 on R and the value 12 otherwise, are derived from X.
Note that for every act f , L c is a subset of D(f ).
Example 2 An urn contains 100 balls of four colors: white, black, red and green. It is known that there are 90 white or black balls and that there are 90 white or red balls. Thus, S = {W, B, R, G}, P (W, B) = P (W, R) = .9. Consider the act 1l {W,B} , that takes the values 1 on {W, B}, and 0 otherwise. The expected value of this act is .9. Moreover, the expectation of any function of the type Z = α1l {W,B} + (1 − α)1l S is .9α + (1 − α) and the expectation of any act smaller than Z is strictly smaller than that of Z. Thus, 1l {W,B} is SFaF. The reason is that Z can be expressed by acts whose expectation is known. Now consider the act 1l W , that takes the value 1 on W and 0 otherwise. The information available provided no information about the probability of W ; it can be anything between .8 and .9. A decision maker who dislikes ambiguity would evaluate the expectation of 1l W at .8. Adding 1l S to 1l W would result in an act, say Y , whose expectation is 1.8.
Denote X = 1l {W,B} + 1l {W,R} . Note that the expectation of X is also 1.8. However, X coincides with Y in all states except for G. On G the act X takes the value 0 while Y takes the value 1. Thus, by reducing the value that Y takes on G from 1 to 0 does not reduce the expectation of Y . Thus, 1l W is not SFaF.
The reason is that there is no way to get a precise evaluation for the probability of W . The evaluation of this probability is obtained by taking the lowest estimation that is still consistent with the information provided.
(iii d ) Derived Fat-Free Independence: Let f, g and h be acts derived from the same fat-free act.
Then, for every α ∈ (0, 1), f g implies that αf + (1 − α)h αg + (1 − α)h. (iii) Strongly-Fat-Free Independence: Let f, g be acts and h be SF aF . Then, for every α ∈ (0, 1),
Axioms (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) imply that there is an affine function defined on L c that represents
The following axiom originates from Schmeidler (1989) and is used also by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) .
(v) Uncertainty Aversion: For every f, g and h in L, if f h and g h, then for every α in (0, 1),
For simplicity, I add the conciseness axiom, which states that every constant act is FaF. If a constant act is not FaF, then one state is known to have probability zero, in which case this state can be omitted from S. 
Some implications of the axioms
The following two lemmas state that every act has an equivalent FaF act. The first lemma deals with (iii d ) and the second with (iii). 6 Notation 1 Let f be an act. While every act has an equivalent FaF act, this is not the case with SFaF. However, as the next lemma states, every act has some mixture with the maximally constant act which is SFaF.
4 Partially specified probabilities 4.1 Probabilities specified on a sub-algebra A probability specified on a sub-algebra over S is a pair (P, A) such that A is an algebra 7 of subsets of S and P is a probability over S.
Let ψ be a non-negative function defined over S and let (P, A) be a probability specified on a sub-algebra over S.
Denote,
where 1l E is the indicator of E.
The decision maker obtains the probability of every event in A. She can therefore able to calculate the expectation of any function of the form E∈A λ E 1l E : the expectation is simply E∈A λ E P (E). The integral of a function ψ is defined as the maximal expectation of those functions of the form E∈A λ E 1l E that are below ψ. 7 A set A of subsets of S is called algebra if S ∈ A and for every E1, E2 ∈ A the intersection, E1 ∩ E2, and the complement, S \ E1, are also in A.
Remark 2 (a) If ψ is measurable with respect to A, then this integral coincides with the regular expectation.
(b) Let (P, A) be a probability specified on a sub-algebra. Since S is finite, A is generated by a partition, say P, of S. Thus, the integral can be written also with a further restriction that all sets E are taken from the partition P and, moreover, that the coefficients λ E are non-negative:
The integral was defined as in eq. (1) in order to keep uniformity with the integral wrt a general partially specified probability defined below (eq. 3).
Example 3 Let S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 } and suppose that the sub-algebra A is generated by the partition {{s 1 , s 2 }, {s 3 , s 4 }}. Furthermore, assume that P (s 1 , s 2 ) = (ii) A function X over S is fat-free (FaF) wrt
Proposition 1 Let I be a real function from [0, 1] S . There is a probability specified on a sub-algebra, 
Partially specified probability
Example 4 (Dynamic Petri plate) Suppose that, like in Ellsberg urn, at day 1 a Petri plate contains 90 organisms of which 30 are red and the others white or black. However, each white organism splits into two once a day. On day 2 the decision maker is called upon to choose from among a few gambles.
The information available to the decision maker on day 2 does not contain the probability of any event; the probability of R is no longer 1 3 . However, the decision maker may deduce, from the information available, the expectation of certain random variables. To illustrate this point, suppose that the number of red, white and black organisms on day 2 are denoted by n r , n w and n b , respectively. On day 1 there were . This is the expectation (on day 2) of the random variable that attains the value 1 on Red, The decision maker knows that a regular probability is underlying this decision problem: the actual distribution of organisms. However, the decision maker obtains only partial information about it. Beyond the obvious information concerning the probability of the whole space and the empty set, on day 2 the decision maker is informed only of the expectation of the random variable (1, The following model of decision making with partially-specified probabilities also captures the case where, in addition to obtaining the probability of some events (but not necessarily all of them), the decision maker obtains some data about the true expectation of some random variables.
A partially-specified probability over S is a pair (P, Y), where Y is a set of real functions over S, Y contains 1l S , and P is a probability over S. Note that any probability specified on a sub-algebra, (P, A), can be identified with a partially-specified probability, (P, Y): Y = {1l A ; A ∈ A}.
Let ψ be a non-negative function defined over S and let (P, Y) be a partially-specified probability.
where 
Remark 3
Although the set Y need not be closed, the maximum (as opposed to supremum) on the righthand side of eq. (3) is obtained. Indeed, Lemma 6 below states that without loss of generality Y can be assumed to be finite. Therefore, writing 'maximum' is justifies.
Example 5 Consider S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 } and suppose that the real probability over S is P . However, the decision maker is informed only of the probability of A = {s 1 , s 2 } and B = {s 2 , s 3 } (and, as usual, of S).
Note that A, B and S do not form an algebra. In this case Y = {1l A , 1l B , 1l S }. Let ψ = 1l S\A . Since,
Now let ψ be a function over S defined as follows:
. This example is revisited in the context of strategic interactions (see Example 7 (4) below.) Notation 2 Let A be a set of subsets of S (not necessarily an algebra) that contains S. We denote
The following lemma states that without loss of generality, the set Y can be assumed to be finite.
Lemma 6
Let (P, Y) be a partially-specified probability. Then, there is a finite subset of Y, say Y , such
An important feature of the integral w.r.t. a partially-specified probability is concavity. It states that, as a function defined on functions, the integral is concave.
Lemma 7 Let (P, Y) be a partially-specified probability. Then, for every two functions ψ and φ,
The following lemma makes the connection between the partially specified probability model and the multiple-prior model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) . It states that for every partially-specified probability (P, Y) one can find a finite number of probability distributions, such that the integral with respect to (P, Y) is equal to the minimum of the respective (additive) integrals.
Lemma 8 Let (P, Y) be a partially-specified probability. Then, there is a finite subset Q of probability distributions over S such that
Proposition 2 Let I be a real function from [0, 1] S . There is a partially-specified probability, (P, Y), such 5 Theorems 5.1 Decision making with a probability specified on sub-algebra
(iv) and (v) if and only if there is a probability specified on a sub-algebra (P, A) and an affine function u on
Theorem 1 suggests that the probability underlying the decision making problem is indeed additive, but the decision maker is only informed of the probabilities of some of the events (that form a sub-algebra) and not about all of them. The decision maker is informed of the probability of every event in the algebra
A. An act f associates with the state s the lottery f (s). The utility of this lottery is u(f (s)). Thus, the act f , combined with the utility function u, induces a correspondence between states and numbers (utility),
The decision maker evaluates the worth of the act f using the information available: he approximates the function u • f by functions whose expectation can be calculated. Axioms (i), (ii),(iii d ),(iv) and (v) imply that there exists a probability P specified on a sub-algebra A, such that the preference order is determined by the evaluations of acts using (P, A). The act f is preferred to the act g (i.e., f g) iff the evaluation of f , u(f (s))dP A , is at least as high as the evaluation of g, u(g(s))dP A .
A probability specified on a sub-algebra, (P, A), induces a capacity v (P,A) , defined over S: v (P,A) (E) = 1l E dP A . This capacity is convex 8 . By Remark 2 (b), v (P,A) = max F ⊆E, F ∈A P (F ) and according to Lehrer In other words, the model proposed by Theorem 1 is with that the model of Choquet expected utility maximization introduced in Schmeidler (1989) . Moreover, as a convex game, v has a large core 9 and by Azriely and Lehrer (2005) , axioms (i), (ii) (iii d ),(iv) and (v) imply that the preference over acts is determined by the minimum of the expectations of many probability distributions, as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) .
The non-additivity of v (P,A) stems from the incomplete information the decision maker obtains about the real probability. While the decision maker might know that the probability governing the decision problem is additive, his use of the partial information he has about it is equivalent to assigning nonadditive probability to events whose probability is not explicitly specified (ambiguous). It is important to note that not every capacity is of the form v (P,A) , and therefore the model of decision making with probability specified on a sub-algebra is a strict sub-model of the Choquet expected-utility maximization model.
There are a few conceptual differences between the models, which pertain also to the comparison between the model of decision making with partially-specified probability and the model of decision making with a multiple-prior. This issue is discussed in the next subsection.
Decision making with a partially-specified probability
Theorem 2 Let be a binary relation over L. This satisfies (i)-(iv) and (vi) if and only if there is a partially-specified probability (P, Y), with Y being finite, and an affine function u on ∆(N ) such that for
and moreover, if c is a constant act and f ≤ c satisfies
In order to evaluate an act a decision maker uses the information captured in (P, Y). Anything that can be deduced from this information is employed to its full extent. For instance, if a probability of an event is provided, the probability of its complement can be deduced. Further, a decision maker can deduce the expectation of any linear combination of random variables whose expectations are known.
The model of decision making described in Theorem 2 is consistent with the multiple-prior model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) , and not with the model of Choquet expected-utility maximization (Schmeidler, 1989). There are two features of the current model that make it more structured than the multipleprior model. First, due to Lemma 6, the decision maker uses only a finite number of priors to determine his preference order over acts. Second, there is one probability distribution (referred to as the 'real' one) and a finite set of random variables on which all the priors and the real distribution agree. Moreover, any other distribution that satisfies this last condition can be obtained as a convex combination of the priors.
The Choquet expected-utility maximization model and the multiple-prior model are belief-based: it assumes that there is a (non-additive) belief or a set of priors (beliefs) that the decision maker uses to set up her preferences. In contrast, the partially-specified probability model is information-based: it assumes that the decision maker obtained partial information about the real distribution and based on this information he sets up his preferences. While the belief-based models hinge on a fixed belief or on a fixed set of priors, the information-based model allows the belief to change with the underlying (real) distribution.
This difference between the models is crucial when the underlying (i.e., the real) distribution may vary.
It is particularly important in a strategic interaction, when the states of nature are nothing else than other players' actions, and the source of uncertainty is that other players are mixing or chosen by some scheme of random matching. The partially-specified probability model enables one to examine a strategic interaction with a given information structure (that delineates what each player knows about other players ' strategies) and to analyze the possible equilibria in such a situation. Different equilibria determine different beliefs that players hold about the interaction. That is, whereas the information available is fixed, beliefs may change. This issue is discussed also in the context of partially-specified equilibrium (see Section 7).
Another important matter in this respect is updating. This is discussed later in subsection 8.8.
Notice that Axiom (v) (ambiguity aversion) does not play a role in Theorem 2. This axiom is not assumes. Rather, it is implied, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let be a binary relation over L. Then, axioms (i)-(iv) and (vi) imply (v).
The corollary is a consequence of Lemma 7, which states that the integral w.r.t. a partially specified probability is a concave operator defined on the set of functions.
6 Proofs of the theorems 
As a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U f is unique up to a positive affine transformation. Therefore, there is a unique von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function over D(f ) that represents and satisfies U f (m) = 0 and U f (M) = 1. Thus, for every k ∈ L c and every two FaF acts f
Thus, U represents .
Define u(y) = U (y) for every y ∈ ∆(N ). For every X ∈ [0, 1] S there is an act f X such that for every
In order to use Proposition 1, it will be shown that I satisfies properties (1)- (6). (1) follows from (ii)
and from the fact that if
(2) follows from Lemma 1. As for (3), assume that X and Y are derived from the same FaF Z. Then, f Z is FaF and furthermore,
(Y ). Due to eq. (6) one obtains (3).
Let X be FaF. Thus, f X is FaF and m, f cX ∈ D(f X ) whenever 0 ≤ c and cX
The second equality is due to eq. (7), and the third is due to the fact that m ∈ D(f X ).
For c > 1 the proof method is similar, and is therefore omitted. Thus, (4) is proven.
In fact, one may conclude from (1) and (4) I that satisfies properties (1)-(6) of Proposition 1 and therefore, there exists a probability specified on a sub-algebra, (P, A) such that I(X) = XdP A for every X ∈ [0, 1] S . Thus, U (f ) = I(X f ) = X f dP A = u • f dP A , as desired. Denote by L SF aF the set of the SFaF acts. Lemma 3 states that L SF aF is convex. Due to (i), (iii) and (iv) U is affine over L SF aF .
Like in the previous proof, define I on [0, 1] S as follows. For every X ∈ [0, 1] S and every act f define the act f X and the function X f as before. Note that X f X = X. Moreover, if X is SFaF, so is f X . Define,
We show that I satisfies properties (1)- (6) of Proposition 2. (1) is ensured by (ii); (2) is guaranteed by Lemma 5; (4) is due to I(01l S ) = 0, 01l S is SFaF and that has a vN-M representation over the set of acts αm + (1 − α)f X for every function X; (3) holds due to (4) and (iii); (5) is satisfied because of (vi) and due to (4); finally, (6) is satisfied since
Proposition 2 ensures that there is a partially-specified probability (P, Y) such that
However, c1l S is SFaF and thus, X f = c1l S , which means that f ∼ c, as required.
7 Equilibrium with partially-specified probabilities 7.1 Partially specified equilibrium Commuters might hear, on the radio, about traffic conditions on some particular main routes, but certainly not about the condition on any tiny alley. In other words, a typical commuter is only partially informed about the distribution of commuters in the road system. Nevertheless, based on this information commuters plan optimal paths that would minimize their traveling time.
The distribution of vehicles on the roads in not determined by nature. Rather, this distribution, to which an individual commuter responds, is determined by the joint decision of many decision makers. However, as opposed to the traditional assumption that underlies Nash equilibrium that players best respond to actions taken by all other players, here, players respond best, to the best of their knowledge, subject to partial information they receive about what other players do. This section introduces an equilibrium notion where players obtain just a partial specification of other players' actions.
Let G = (M, {B i } i∈M , {u i } i∈M ) be a game: M is a finite set of players, B i is player i's set of pure strategies (finite), and u i : B → R is player i's payoff function, where B = × i∈M B i . Denote by ∆(B i ) the set of mixed strategies of player i and for every i denote, B −i = × j =i B j . B −i is the set of action profiles of all players excluding i.
For every b −i ∈ B −i and player i's mixed strategy
This is the linear extension of u i to ∆(B i ) × B −i .
Suppose that player i knows about players in N \ {i} only the probabilities of some subsets of B −i but not of all subsets. More specifically, suppose that player j plays the mixed strategy p j . When i = j, player i does not know p j in its entirety. Rather, player i knows only the probability of some subsets in or of some random variables defined over B j . The set of random variables over B j whose expectation are known to player i is denoted by I j i . That is, player i knows only the expectation E p j (Y j
1l B −i ) itself. A profile {p i } i∈M ∈ × i∈M ∆(B i ) of mixed strategies is a partially-specified equilibrium w.r.t.
The notion of partially-specified equilibrium is information-based. The information structure, namely, the information available to each player, determines the set of equilibria. No player has a prior belief about other players' strategies. The belief a player has about the actual strategies played by all others is determined by these strategies, as well as by the partial information a player obtains about them.
When Y i contains all the variables of the form 1l b i for every b i ∈ B i and for every palyer i, then a partially-specified equilibrium w.r.t. Y 1 , ..., Y n coincides with Nash equilibrium. Unlike Nash equilibrium, in a typical partially-specified equilibrium the pure strategies in the support of player i's strategy are not necessarily best responses. To illustrate this point consider the following example. ) and the only partially-specified equilibrium when both players' information is trivial, is ((
Note that L obtains a positive probability, although it is not a best response to ( (neither when player 2 knows nothing about this strategy, nor when player 2 does know it). Furthermore, when plays 2's knowledge about the strategy played by player 1 is trivial, R is the worst strategy that player 2 can play against ( ). Nevertheless, R is played in equilibrium with a positive probability.
(2) Let a two-player game be given by
Suppose, as in the previous example, that each player knows nothing about his opponent's strategy. When playing (p, 1 − p), the expected payoff is min(2p, 2p + 3(1 − p)). The maximum is achieved when p = 1.
The same applies to player 2, and the only partially-specified equilibrium when both players' information is trivial, is (T, L).
In case player 1 has full information about player 2's strategy, still (T, L) is the only partially-specified equilibrium. Consider the case where player 1 knows the probability assigned by player 2 to R, and player 2 knows the probability assigned by player 1 to B. In other words, A 1 is generated by the partition {{L, M }, {R}} and A 2 is generated by the partition {{T, C}, {B}}. In equilibrium player 1 plays (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) and player 2 plays (q 1 , q 2 , q 3 ). When p 1 + p 2 > 0, as in example (1),
There are three equilibria: a. p = ( (3) each player knows the probability of some subsets of the other player's set of strategies, and these subsets form an algebra. In the following example the set of subset whose probability is known to player 2 is not an algebra.
Consider the following zero-sum game. If player 1 plays (α, 1 − α), then the payoff matrix reduces to
Suppose that player 2 plays the mixed strategy P . Player 1 evaluates his strategies using the partiallyspecified (P, Y), where 11 Y = {A, B, S}. This is a situation similar to that discussed in Example 5. The expected payoff of player 1 is precisely ψd Y P , with ψ being the function analyzed in Example 5. When α ≤ 1 2 , this integral was found to be max
If this maximum is attained at the left figure, (1 − α)P (S \ A) + (1 − α)P (S \ B) − α, then player 1, in order to maximize his payoff, would choose α = 0. This is impossible. Thus, the maximum is attained at the right figure, αP (A) + (1 − α)P (S \ A). The maximum could be at α = in which case the expected payoff is
Thus, in a partially-specified equilibrium player 1 plays (
2 ) and player 2 assigns probability 1 2 to the strategies in A. In other words, any mixed strategy of player 2 that assigns probability 2 ) of player 1) a partially-specified equilibrium.
The following theorem ensures the existence of a partially-specified equilibrium for every information structure.
Theorem 3 Let Y i be the random variables whose expectation are known to player i, i ∈ M . Then, there exists a partially-specified equilibrium w.r.t. Y 1 , ..., Y n . This theorem can be proven by a standard fixed-point technique. It is based on the fact that the integral is concave (see Lemma 7) and therefore the best-response correspondence is convex valued. The details are omitted.
In Nash equilibrium, each player plays a best response to the actual strategies of the other players.
In other words, Nash equilibrium requires that beliefs are rationalized by actual behavior. In partiallyspecified equilibrium, players play their best response to the partial specification they obtain regarding the actual strategies of the other players. Dow and Werlang (1994) defined equilibrium with non-additive probabilities. In this equilibrium, players play their best response to their beliefs. However, besides one restriction, namely that only strategies which appear in the set defined to be the support 12 are allowed to be played, there is no relation between 11 Here an event is identified with its characteristic function. 12 The support of a non-additive has a few different plausible interpretations.
the strategies played and the beliefs. Such a latitude seems to allow for an excessive degree of freedom: beliefs of players are essentially unrelated to their actual behavior.
Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) extended the notion of Dow and Werlang (1994) from two-player games to n-player games.
Partially-specified-correlated equilibrium
Correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1972 (Aumann , 1987 refers to a case where the players get some (correlated) information before playing the game. This information need not, and is usually not, related to the game itself. Neither it is related to the state of nature, in case of a game with incomplete information, nor is it related to the payoffs. The actions taken by a player depend on her information.
One way to define correlated equilibrium is to extend the game by adding a pre-play getting-informationstage. As before, let G = (M, {B i } i∈M , {u i } i∈M ) be a game. In addition to this game, let Ω, µ be a probability space, which will serve as the correlation means.
Before the game starts, a point ω ∈ Ω is randomly selected according to µ. Player i obtains a signal in H i that depends on ω. Formally, let h i : Ω → H i . Upon getting a signal h i (ω), player i takes an action. A strategy of player i is a function σ i :
A profile σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ |M | ) of strategies induces a probability distribution over B, say P σ . However, not only µ is partially specified, the distribution that (σ j (r j )) j =i induces over B −i (for r j ∈ H j , j = i) is also partially specified to i. When getting the signal r i = h i (ω i ) player i has the partially specified probability
i ), where P σ −i ,µ (·|r i ) is the probability distribution induced by σ −i and µ, given r i , and Y r i i is a set of random variables over B −i whose expectation is known to player i.
Definition 4
Let Ω, µ be a finite probability space and h i : Ω → H i be a signaling function. The tuple (σ 1 , ..., σ |M | ), where σ i : H i → ∆(B i ), is partially-specified-correlated equilibrium w.r.t. Y r i i (r i ∈ H i , i ∈ M ), if for every player i ∈ M and for every r i ∈ H i obtained with positive probability, the mixed action σ i (r i ) maximizes player i's payoff. In other words, for every player i, r i ∈ H i and a strategy σ i ,
Note that each player has a list of partially specified probabilities, one for each possible signal that he may receive from the mediator. , 0) is a best response. when getting the signal b player 1 knows that player 2 plays with probability 1 L or C, to which playing B is a best response. Therefore, σ 1 is a best response of player 1 to the probability induced by µ and σ 2 , subject to the partial information he has about it. Since the same conclusion applies also to player 2, we obtained a partially-specified-correlated equilibrium.
Any correlated equilibrium with fully specified probability has a canonic representation where Ω = ×B i , H i = B i and σ i is the identity for every player i. This is so, because when a mixed action is a best response, so is every pure action in its support. However, in case the probability are partially specified, this is no longer true. The partially-specified-correlated equilibrium of the previous example has no canonic representation simply because the unique best response to mixed action partially specifies as 1 2 on {L, C} and 1 2 on the pure strategy R is a mixed action.
Partially-specified probabilities and games with incomplete information
A game with incomplete information is characterized by a set T i of player i's type and a probability distribution, q over T = × i∈M T i . A profile t = (t 1 , ..., t |M | ) ∈ T is selected according to q, player i is informed of his type a the game G t = (M, {B
is played. The probability q, however, is not fully specified to the players.
Denote for every player i, T −i = × j =i T j . After obtaining the information t i about his own type, player i gets a partial information about q(·|t i ). More specifically, player i obtains the PSP (q(·|t i ), I A mixed strategy of player i, say σ i , assigns to every t i ∈ T i a mixed strategy in ∆(
is a distribution over B t i i .
Definition 5
The tuple (σ 1 , ..., σ |M | ) is an equilibrium with partially specified probabilities about the types that are given by B t i i , i ∈ M , t i ∈ T i , if for every player i ∈ M ,and for every t i ∈ T i , the mixed strategy σ i (t i ) maximizes his payoff. In other words, for every player i and a mixed strategy σ i ,
In a more general setup a vector t is chosen according to a prior q and player receive (possibly correlated) signals that stochastically depend on t. Player i receives the signal s i ∈ S i with probability π(s i |t). However, player i does not know π. After getting the signal s i he has a PSP over T × S −i , where
This PSP is denoted (p i (·|s i ), I i (·|s i )). In this setup, a strategy, σ i , of player i assigns to every s i ∈ S i a mixed strategy in ∆(B i ) (B i is player i's set of pure actions).
The tuple (σ 1 , ..., σ |M | ) is an equilibrium with partially specified probabilities about the types, given by (p i (·|s i ), I i (·|s i )), i ∈ M , s i ∈ S i , if for every player i ∈ M , and for every t i ∈ T i , the mixed strategy σ i (t i ) maximizes his payoff. In other words, for every player i and a mixed strategy σ i ,
Note that in the previous definition players have a partial knowledge about the types of others, while unlike Definition 3 the players know the strategy played by others. Obviously, one might combine the two and define an equilibrium in which players have partially specified probabilities on signals, states and strategies. The definitions seem to be clear and are therefore omitted. 
Discussion

On ambiguity aversion
This analysis is meant to introduce a first-order approximation to the way by which people take decisions in the presence of a partially-specified probability. In Ellsberg's original decision problem, Gamble X is weakly dominated by gamble Z. Nevertheless, the theory of decision making with a partially-specified probability would predict that X and Z are equivalent. To make things even worse, suppose that X is modified a bit and instead of $100, the prize for drawing a red ball is $101. In this case, X is predicted to be strictly preferred to Z.
The reason for this difficulty is that the theory takes an extreme ambiguity-aversion approach: any information provided is taken without any sense of skepticism and anything else is ignored.
Similar difficulties also arise within the expected utility theory. It might happen that one act weakly dominates another while they are actually equivalent. This happens when big prizes are ascribed probability 0 and are therefore not counted in the expected utility.
To improve upon the current theory, one might think of discriminating between different information sources according to their reliability. More reliable sources will be getting a greater weight than less reliable ones. In this case, wild guesses are also reliable to a certain extent, and should therefore be taken into account with a weight determined according to their reliability level. One may think of a reliability factor r Y attached to every Y ∈ Y. This factor r Y is meant to indicate the extent to which the information about Y is reliable. This factor could be then taken into account when evaluating a function ψ, as follows:
In this figure the number
8.2 A limited use of partially-specified probability and framing effects Let (P, Y) be a partially-specified probability over S and let ψ be a non-negative function defined over
The following lemma states that without loss of generality, the set Y can be assumed to be convex, or otherwise, the set of extreme points of a convex set. 13 Lemma 9 Let (P, Y) be a partially-specified probability. (ii) Denote the set of extreme points of the convex hull of convY by Y , then
Notation 3
The set that contains all the acts that are mixtures of FaF acts is denoted L F aF . That is,
; f ∈ L}, where conv stands for the 'convex hull of '.
(iii + ) Convex Fat-Free Independence: Let f, g and h be in L F aF . Then, for every α ∈ (0, 1), f g implies that αf + (1 − α)h αg + (1 − α)h. 13 The proofs of the assertions made in this sub-section can be found in the first version of this paper .
Theorem 4
The binary relation over L satisfies (i),(ii), (iii + ),(iv) and (v) if and only if there is a partially-specified probability (P, Y) and an affine function u on ∆(N ) such that for every f, g ∈ L, f g iff
In order to evaluate an act, a decision maker uses Y, which captures available data. Anything in Y is considered to its full extent, while anything out of Y is totally ignored. Theorem 4 states that the evaluation of acts is done only by convex (as opposed to linear) combination of functions whose expectation is known. This extra requirement imposes a limitation on the use of available information and creates a few anomalies.
A partially-specified probability (P, Y) induces a capacity v, defined over S:
for every E S. This capacity is neither convex nor does it have a large core (see Sharkey, 1982 Equality holds only if X is either constant or FaF. This implies that a decision-maker whose preferences are determined by a partially specified probability (P, Y) and + • dP Y is typically not a Choquet expectedutility maximizer nor does he follow the model of decision making based on the minimum over a set of priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) To illustrate this point, let X = ( ) (that is, X is a random variable defined on S = {1, 2, 3}) and suppose that Y = {1l S , X}. Moreover, it is given that E(X) = . This illustrates the fact that
Another way to demonstrate that the preference order induced by (P, Y) and + is not determined by the minimum over a set of probability distributions is to show that the integral is not co-variant with adding a constant. Consider the previous example. On one hand Consider a state space S = {1, 2, 3} and Y = {1l S , 1l {1,2} }. A decision maker that follows the model of Theorem 4 knows the probability of the event {1, 2}, but ignores the probability of the event {3} that can be easily calculated. Such a decision maker trusts only explicit information that he obtains and ignores anything else. While obtaining the probability of {1, 2} is equivalent to obtaining the probability of {3}, 14 span(Y) stands for the linear space spanned by Y.
the specific framing of information might therefore affect the entire decision making process. To put it more formally, denote Y = {1l S , 1l {3} }. The partially-specified probabilities (P, Y) and (P, Y ) are not equivalent as far as + is concerned. That is,
Such framing effects do not exist when the partially-specified probability is used as described in Theorem 2.
On computational complexity and decision making
The decision maker is informed of the expectation of each random variable in Y. He then uses this database to evaluate acts by computing integrals of random variables. The complexity of such a computation can be measured by the number of basic computational steps required.
In Eq. (3) the integral of the random variable ψ is defined as the maximum over all summations of the
The length of the summations is not limited a-priori. A decision maker with a bounded computational capacity might be incapable of performing summations of unlimited lengths. Such a decision maker might be capable of computing only summations of a bounded length. In this case, if he can deal with summations of any length less than or equal to L, the evaluation of a random
Using the information available in this way, induces a preference order over acts. It is clear that two decision makers that have the same data-base but different computational capacities would have different preference orders.
Limiting the summations involved to those with length of at most L, prevents the decision maker from fully exploit all the the information available. Thus, the restricted calculation expressed in Eq. (15) might be also interpreted as a kind of bounded rationality on the part of the decision maker. It would be interesting to find the properties of the preference orders of boundedly rational decision makers modeled this way.
For a given decision maker with a bounded computational capacity, different representations of the information available would result in different preference orders over acts. To illustrate this point, consider a decision maker who is informed only about the probability of the event A is 1 2 . When the length of the computable summations is bounded by L = 1, the estimation of the probability of the complement of A, A c , is 0. However, if the same information is expressed differently, for instance, that the probability of A c is a half, then the estimation of the probability of A is 0. This is a framing effect similar to that discussed in subsection 8.2.
More on the fat free independence axiom
The FaF independence axiom states that if f, g and h are in L F aF , then for every α ∈ (0, 1), f g implies that αf + (1 − α)h αg + (1 − α)h. Theorem 2 could have proven using a weaker version of this axiom: Let f , g and h be acts of the form αz + (1 − α)y, with z is being FaF, y being a constant and α ∈ (0, 1). Then, for every α ∈ (0, 1), f g implies that αf + (1 − α)h αg + (1 − α)h. In other words the independence property is required to hold within every L z =convL c ∪ {z}.
On the definition of SFaF
The definition of a strongly fat-free axiom uses the constant act c 1 . Then, the Axiom (iii) is formulated.
This very axiom is needed to determine that there is a vN-M representation on L c , which in turn guarantees that there exists a maximal element in M in L c . Lemma 4 states that the definition of SFaF could have been using M rather than c 1 . However, at that point the existence of M is not yet guaranteed.
Instead of the current definition of SFaF, one could avoid using c 1 and adopt a more stringent definition:
f is a strongly fat-free act if any combination of f with any constant act is FaF. In the presence of the other axioms, this definition would be equivalent to the current version.
On the continuity axiom
The continuity axiom used above is a bit stronger than that used by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
It has been required in (iv)(a) (the first part of the continuity axiom) that if f g and g h, then there is α in (0, 1) such that αf + (1 − α)h g. The vN-M axiom requires that the same conclusion holds under a weaker condition: f g and g h.
The stronger axiom is needed in the proof of Lemmas 1 and 2. The independence axiom holds only for fat-free acts (and their derivatives). A-priori, there is only one fat-free act: m (if exists). Axioms (i), (iv) and a weaker version of (iii) could ensure only that there is a vN-M utility representation of over L c . However, to ensure a broader scope of the independence axiom, it is essential that every act has an equivalent act which is fat free. A weaker version of the continuity axiom, would not be sufficient for this purpose.
Additivity and fat free acts
It turns out that when the probability is specified on a sub-algebra, the integral in eq. (1) is additive over the set of functions that are measurable with respect to this sub-algebra. This means that the implied expected utility is additive when restricted to fat-free acts derived from them. This phenomenon is strongly related to that of Epstein and Zhang (2001) , where the probability restricted to the set of unambiguous events is additive. There, this set is more general than an algebra: it might be a λ-system.
When the probability is partially specified (not over a sub-algebra), additivity is preserved over the strongly fat-free acts, which by Lemma 3, form a convex set. This does not mean that a convex combination of fat-free (not strongly so) acts is necessarily fat free.
Updating partially specified probabilities and time consistency
Updating non-additive probabilities in light of a new information has caught a lot of attention 15 . When dealing with partially-specified probability, there are two kinds of information arrival: the probability of an event whose probability was previously unknown, or the news that a certain event already occurred (in which case, the uncertainty remains within this event). In the first case, there is no need to update any belief. The model takes into account any new piece of information that comes in.
The second kind of information arrival demonstrates some paradoxical outcomes. To illustrate this point, consider
Example 8 A paradox of time inconsistency: An urn that contains 100 balls. 50 are either white or black and 50 are either red or green. A random ball is drawn, the decision maker receives some signal that depends on the color drawn, and she then has to take an action. Her utility depends on the color selected and on her action. There are three actions: a, b, and c.
Essentially, there are four states, S = {W, B, R, G} the decision maker knows that the probability of {W, B} and of {R, G} is The signalling structure is described as follows: if either W or G realize, the decision maker is informed of {W, G} , and she is informed of {B, R} if either B or R realize. In other words, she is not able to distinguish between W and G nor is she able to distinguish between B and R; but she is able to tell whether or not W or G occurred and whether or not B or R occurred. The signals in this case are {W, G} and {B, R}. Upon getting a signal about the state realized, the decision maker has to perform an action.
A strategy of the decision maker is a map from signals to actions. That is, a strategy prescribes what actions the decision maker has to take on {W, G} and on {B, R}. She would like to maximize her utility.
What would an optimal strategy be?
It is clear that on {W, G}, b is the dominant action, and on {B, R}, b is the worst action. The question is therefore to determine whether to take action a or c when either B or R occur. Taking action a results in the payoffs X = (1, 1, 3, 3) (a payoff per state) and taking action c results in the payoffs Y = (1, 2, 2, 3).
The integral of X, w.r.t. the partially specified probability described above, is Thus, playing b after hearing that {W, G} occurred, and a after hearing that {B, R} occurred is an optimal strategy. Now suppose that time comes and either B or R occurred. The decision maker knows it, but she knows nothing beyond it. Given that either B or R occurred, what is the best action? Now c is the best action, because by playing c she guarantees the utility 2, while the minimal utility when playing a is 1.
While the (ex-ante) optimal strategy entails playing a on {B, R} when one of these states is realized, the (ex-post) best action is c. It seems that this lack of consistency is intrinsic to decision making with partially specified probabilities (unless one arbitrary additive probability that is consistent with the data is used).
Time inconsistencies in non-expected utility models have long been recognized (see, e.g., Machina 1989 ).
The example above shows that this kind of phenomenon occurs also when the underlying probability is additive, the decision maker may even know that this is the case, but she obtains only partial information about it.
Bayesianism and partially-specified probabilities
An orthodox Bayesian approach would dictate that whenever only partial information about the probability is available, the decision maker should adopt an additive probability which is consistent with the data.
For instance, in Ellsberg's urn, since only the probability of white or black is known and the probability of each color, separately, is unknown, the decision maker should assign a probability to white and to black.
A uniform distribution, namely 1 3 to white and black, seems 'natural' in this relatively simple case. Suppose however, that there are five states of nature: S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 }. Furthermore, the information available is that the probability of {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } and of {s 3 , s 4 } is .9, each. Obviously, a uniform distribution over {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } or over {s 3 , s 4 } is inconsistent with any distribution that assigns to {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } and to {s 3 , s 4 } probability .9, each. A plausible possibility is to adopt the distribution that maximizes the entropy of all probability distributions that are consistent with the information available. This would be a natural way to replace the uniform distribution in case this is impossible.
The entropy has some desirable properties that become significant when applied to measuring the quantity of information. However, when it comes to decision problems, the entropy has no greater role than any other (symmetric) concave function. This assertion is bolstered by Blackwell (1953) who compared between information structures in relation to utility maximization. One of his results refers to all concave functions and not to any particular one.
9 Final comments 9.1 Convex capacities and partially-specified probabilities.
Let v be a convex capacity (i.e, v is a real function defined on the power set of S such that v(∅) = 0 and
Let (P, A) be a probability specified on a sub-algebra. Define the capacity v P,A as follows. v P,A (E) = 1l E dP A = max B⊆E; B∈A P (B).
It is clear that v P,A is convex (see footnote 8). The following proposition characterizes those convex capacities that are of the form v P,A (E).
Proposition 3 Let v be convex non-additive probability. There exists a probability specified on a subalgebra (P, A) such that v = v P,A if and only if, for every fat-free event E and for every F ,
The proof appears in the Appendix.
Let T ⊆ S. A unanimity capacity u T is defined as u T (E) = 1 if T ⊆ E, and u T (E) = 0, otherwise. It turns out that a unanimity capacity is also of the form v P,A : A = {T, S \ T }, P (T ) = 1 and P (S \ T ) = 0.
Moreover, a capacity v P,A is a convex combination of unanimity games of a special kind, as demonstrated by the following lemma.
The lemma uses this notation: a sub-algebra A is generated by a partition, denoted Q(A).
Lemma 10 Let v be a capacity. There is a probability specified on a sub-algebra, (P, A), such that v = v P,A if and only if there is a partition Q of S such that v = T ∈Q α T u T , where α T ≥ 0 and T ∈Q α T = 1.
Moreover, Q = Q(A).
The proof is simple and is therefore omitted.
9.2 Exact capacities and partially-specified probabilities.
Let (P, Y) be a partially-specified probability and define the capacity v P,Y in a similar manner of v P,A .
Lemma 8 shows that v P,Y is exact. 16 I do not know how to characterize those exact capacities that stem from a partially-specified probability, namely that there exits a partially specified probability (P, Y) such that v(T ) = 1l T dP Y for every T ⊆ S.
The following lemma (whose proof is omitted) characterizes the case where v = v
(recall, eq. (13)) and Y consists only of characteristic functions.
Lemma 11 Let v be a capacity. There is a partially-specified probability on a (P, Y) with Y consisting only of characteristic functions such that v = v + P,Y if and only if v = T ⊆S α T u T , where α T ≥ 0 and
Proof of Lemma 2. A closer look at the previous proof reveals that it hinges on (ii), (iv) and on the fact that is continuous over L c . Since the independence axiom (iii) applies to L c , the latter is true under the assumptions of this lemma and thus the proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Assume that f and g are SFaF and let 0 < α < 1. Let 0 ≤ β < 1 and an act h be such that h < β(αf
Define the act h : for every s ∈ S, h (s) = max (βαf + (1 − βα)m)(s), h(s) , where the maximum is taken w.r.t. .
The act f is also SFaF and, therefore by (iii), βαf +(1−βα)h ≺ βαf +(1−βα)
The left-hand side is h and therefore the desired assertion.
Proof of Lemma 4: If f is SFaF, then for every α ∈ [0, 1), αf + (1 − α)c 1 is FaF. Let h be such that h < αf + (1 − α)M. We show that h ≺ αf + (1 − α)M and thereby prove that αf
There is 0 < β ≤ 1 such that βM + (1 − β)m ∼ c 1 . We can assume w.l.o.g. that β < 1. Define
Since f is SFaF, γh + (1 − γ)m ≺ γαf + (1 − γα)c 1 . Moreover, by (vi) m is SFaF, and therefore, due
As for the inverse direction, assume that βf + (1 − β)M is FaF for ever β ∈ (0, 1) and that h < αf + (1 − α)c 1 . We show that h ≺ αf + (1 − α)c 1 . As before, βM + (1 − β)m ∼ c 1 , with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
There is an act g that satisfies, h(s)
Since m is SFaF and due to (iii), ( 
The left-hand side is equal to h and thus, h ≺ αf + (1 − α)c 1 , as desired.
Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose, contrary to the lemma, that there is a sequence α n that converges to zero, and [α n f + (1 − α n )M] is not SFaF. Thus, for every n there is 0 ≤ β n < 1 and an act g n such that
There is no act h n such that g n = β n h n +(1−β n )M. Indeed, if such an h n exists, then
Let γ be the smallest constant such that there exists h n such that g n = γ n h n + (1 − γ n )M (such γ n and h n exist since has a vN-M representation on the set { ; g n is a convex combination of and M}). It must be that γ n > β n and that, for at least one s ∈ S, g n (s) = m(s).
We obtain that γ n h n + (
Since there are finitely many states, there are infinitely many n's and a state s 0 such that h n (s 0 ) = m(s 0 ). Notice that the act h, which coincides with M on S \ {s 0 } and with m on s 0 , satisfies h n ≤ h for infinitely many n's. Thus, by (ii), h 
The last summation is a linear combination of elements from Y . This means that ψdP Y ≤ ψdP Y and equality is established. As Y is finite, T is piecewise linear: D can be split into a finite number of closed sets on each of which T is linear. As a piecewise linear concave function T can be expressed also as a minimum of finitely many affine functions. That is, there are finitely many S-dimensional vectors Q i and scalars b i such that 17 T (ψ) = min i ψ · Q i + b i for every ψ ∈ D. Since s∈S ψ(s) = 1 for every ψ ∈ ∆, one can find S-dimensional vectors Q i such that min i ψ · Q i + b i = ψ · Q i . Therefore, T is a minimum of finitely many linear functions over ∆. Since T is non-negative over ∆, these vectors are non-negative.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let ψdP
It remains to show that the vectors Q i are all probability vectors. Suppose, on the contrary, that there is ψ ∈ ∆ such that there is no probability vector P such that P · ψ = T (ψ), and for any other φ ∈ ∆, 17 Here, '·' denotes the inner product between two vectors. P · φ ≤ T (φ). This means that there is 0 < a < 1 such that T (αψ + (1 − α)1l S ) > αT (ψ) + (1 − α)T (1l S ).
However, T (αψ + (1 − α)1l S ) = αψ + (1 − α)1l S dP Y = αψdP Y + (1 − α)1l S dP Y = α ψdP Y + (1 − α) 1l S dP Y = αT (ψ) + (1 − α)T (1l S ). This is a contradiction. We conclude that the integral of a partially specified probability is a minimum of finitely many regular (additive) integrals.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is broken into five steps. During the proof I make use of eq. (8) which was proven based on (1) and (4) alone.
Step 1 Step 1, I( α i X i ) ≥ α i I(X i ) and I( α i (1l S −X i )) ≥ α i I(1l S −X i ). Summing these two inequality, one obtains from eq. (16), I( α i X i ) + I( α i (1l S − X i )) ≥ I(1l S ). However, by Step 1, the left-hand side is less than or equal to I( α i (X i + 1l S − X i )) = I( α i (1l S )) = I(1l S ). We obtained that all the inequalities are actually equalities, as desired. Step 4: Separation. Define D = conv{X − I(X)1l S ; X is derived from FaF}. D is a convex set in R S .
D does not intersect the open negative orthant, because if
α i (X i − I(X i )1l S ) << 0, then Step 3 implies I( α i X i ) < I( α i I(X i )1l S ). However, Step 2 implies that both sides are equal, which is a contraction.
Thus, D and the open negative orthant can be separated by a non-zero vector P : P · a ≥ P · b for every a ∈ D and b << 0. Fix a ∈ D. Since for every b << 0, P · a ≥ P · b, P · a ≥ 0. This means that P · X ≥ I(X) for every X derived from FaF.
Note that [1l S ] − I(1l S )1l S = [1l S ] − 1l S ∈ D. Thus D intersects the closed negative orthant. Thus, 0 ≥ P · b for every b << 0 and thus, P ≥ 0. We can therefore assume (one can multiply P by a positive constant if necessary) that the coordinates of P sum up to 1, meaning that P is actually a probability vector.
Step 5: Definition of A. We obtained that P · X ≥ I(X) for every X derived from FaF and therefore, P · (1l S − X) ≥ I(1l S − X). Summing the two inequalities one obtains P · 1l S ≥ I(1l S ), which is actually equality. Thus, P · X = I(X) for every X derived from FaF. For such X, X = λ i 1l R i , where 1l R i are derived from X. Thus, P · X = I(X) = λ i I(1l R i ) = λ i P · 1l R i = λ i P (R i ). Define A to be the algebra generated by all such R i 's.
If X ≥ λ i 1l R i , then by (1), I(X) ≥ I( λ i 1l R i ). If R i ∈ A for every i, then by Step 2, I( λ i 1l R i ) = λ i I(1l R i ). Thus, I(X) ≥ λ i P (R i ). On the other hand, (2) (2)).
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Y be the set of the SFaF functions. This set is not empty (by (5)).
Consider the set D = { X∈Y α X (X − I(X)1l S ); α X ∈ R}. D is convex and is disjoint from the open negative orthant. Indeed, if there exists a summation X∈Y α X (X − I(X)1l S ) = Z << 0 (which means that D and the open negative orthant are not disjoint), then α X >0 α X X + α X <0 |α X |I(X)1l S << α X <0 |α X |X + α X >0 α X I(X)1l S . By (1), (3), (4), and (6), α X >0 α X I(X) + α X <0 |α X |I(X) < α X <0 |α X |I(X) + α X >0 α X I(X), which is a contradiction. The separation theorem ensures the existence of a non-negative vector P = 0 such that P · Y ≥ 0 for every Y ∈ D . Thus, P · (X − I(X)1l S ) ≥ 0 and −P · (X − I(X)1l S ) ≥ 0, meaning that P · (X − I(X)1l S ) = 0 for every X ∈ Y. Therefore, I(X) = P · X for every X ∈ Y. In particular, P · 1l S = 1. Thus, P is a probability vector. Secondly, let E and F be two minimal positive FaF, then E ∩F = ∅. Indeed, v(E ∪F ) = v(E ∪(F \E)) = v(E) + v(F \ E). If E ∩ F = ∅, then F \ E F and therefore, v(F \ E) = 0. Thus, v(E ∪ F ) = v(E).
By a similar argument, v(E ∪ F ) = v(F ). Due to minimality, E ∩ F is a strict subset of both E and F . Finally, let A be the sub-algebra generated by A ∪ {S \ S }, define P (A) = v(A) for every A ∈ A , extend P in a linear manner to A, and for every A ∈ A set P (A) = max B⊆A; B∈A P (B). It is clear that for every A ⊆ S , P (A) ≤ v(A), with equality for every A ∈ A. To show a universal equality one may apply the sequential argument used in the previous paragraph.
